oleg ayrapetov. jan 10, 2020, 15:23 – regnum the conflict that started inna steppes of mongolia was preceded by numerous incidents onna border tween the ussr and manzhou-go. twas completely unclear how the border shootings ‘d end, but twas clear that something extraordinary was happening onna khalkhin-gol river. nobody can say that this is an ordinary border provocation or the threshold offa gr8 war.
there was nothing specific in €. onna one hand, the french rite-wing socialist marcel deaat wrote an article on may 4 entitled “die für danzig?” he explained:
“whn'we fite with our polish friends to defend our territories, our well-bein’ and our freedoms, thris a possibility to think carefully bout whether this will help to build peace. but to die for gdansk, no! “
this call dea became + and + pop in france. twas completely in line w'da slogans of the munich pplz who were still fitin’ for their ideas and supporting dea. in a conversation w'da german ambassador to france on may 20, foreign minister bonnet stated that the french farmer or worker did not wanna fite for gdansk at all. this was obvious to the minister.
onna other hand, at a meeting in hitler on may 23 w'da pticipation of the leadership of the wehrmacht, the air force na navy, it became clear that the living space of the german nation must be expanded. the time of the bloodless reunification ended, and further development was 1-ly recognized as possible if the problem was solved militarily. the problem of danzig was meant. a military solution to the polish problem was recognized as inevitable. the main condition for success was:
“a conflict with poland that begins with an attack on poland will 1-ly be successful if the west aint involved. if this aint possible, tis better to attack the western powers and atta same time end poland. “
in any case, the conflict inna west was recognized as necessary for the future of germany. it ‘d ‘ve been crucial: “the war with england and france ll'be a war not for life but for death.”
meanwhile, potential victims of the nazi aggression continued to hold diplomatic games. however, these dys it seems that changes are finally planned. the beginning seemed encouraging. on may 24, 1939, gr8 britain approved the soviet proposals. onna same dy, the plenipotentiary in paris anncd that the french general staff was in favor of reaching an agreement w'da ussr, its director general gamelen was convinced that the defense of romania ‘d not be guaranteed without moscow’s help. he rated the condition o'their army as unfortunate. onna other hand, the polish secret srvc received information through its channels that germany was bluffing, na state of its economy and armed forces ruled out the possibility of hostilities prior to 1942-1943. this was another factor that brought warsaw to an inexorable attitude towards gdansk.
on may 25, the ussr ambassador for poland ni sharonov anncd his meeting with colonel beck, the polish foreign minister. the
“… stated that the polish government had decided not to pursue the“ peace at all costs ”policy and not to make concessions na' pticular line. poland was not an attacker, he said, that she did not wanna fite, b'that she did not wanna lose independence and ‘d 1-ly come to an honorable agreement, as she also expected sympathy and support from other countries. i replied to help you, you ‘ve to be ready to help, and if poland says “help immediately” tody, we can be unprepared to help without prior agreement. he asked me to contact him personally if necessary regarding ?s of polish politics, steps of polish diplomacy, etc. “
on may 27, the british and french ambassadors in moscow submitted another draft mutual assistance agreement. the soviet government was already aware of this plan. the dy b4, bonnet gave it to potemkin and he sent it to the pplz’s commissariat for education. england, france (art. 1) na ussr (art. 2) ‘d help each other inna event of an attack against them or against another €an country associated w'dem under the aid agreement. surits, who was already extremely suspicious of french politics after munich, was pticularly active. he saw the actions of french politicians regarding the actions of italy and germany in abyssinia, spain, austria and czechoslovakia as the culmination of irresponsibility and stupidity. he ?ed the content of the essentialisms of the 4th and fifth draft treaties. onnis view, the publishers ‘ve significantly restricted the validity offa possible agreement, and essentialisms 1 and 2 were not specific, and essentialisms 4 and 5 were ptly semantically in conflict w'da 1st two.
they sounded like this:
“art. 4. ‘d circumstances arise that endanger the fulfillment o'their obligations and mutual support, the 3 countries will immediately start consultations to investigate the situation. the methods and scope of such a consultation ll'be the subject offa subsequent discussion tween the 3 countries. art. 5. tis agreed that support and assistance inna above cases ‘d not affect the rites and positions of other powers. “
bonnet agreed with potemkin’s opinion, but noted that this had been done inna case of article 4 atta request of london, as the british wanted to “… distinguish tween the” fact “of aggression na” threat “of aggression. inna 1st case, essentialisms one and two of the agreement enter into force. inna 2nd case, when thris 1-ly a risk of aggression, na third article onna consultation. “article 5 was introduced to“ reassure poland and romania ”, which generally changed lil wrt the ussr.
on may 27, when the chairman of the council of pplz’s commissars na molotov pplz’s congress adopted a draft agreement of representatives of england and france after hearing their statements onna thorough preparation of the document
“… he started by saying that after gettin acquainted w'da anglo-french project, he came to a neg conclusion bout this document. the anglo-french project not 1-ly does not contain a plan to organize effective mutual support for the ussr, england and france against aggression in €, t'does not even point to the serious interest of the english and french governments in a pact w'da ussr complete. the anglo-french proposals suggest that the governments of england and france aint so interested inna pact itself, but rather talk bout it. tis possible that england and france may need these conversations for a specific purpose. the soviet government does not know these goals. tis not bout talking bout the pact, but bout the effective mutual support of the ussr, gr8 britain and france gainsta aggression in €. the soviet government does not intend to pticipate 1-ly in discussions bout the pact, the aims of which the ussr does not know. the english and french governments can also hold such talks with ptners who are + suitable than the ussr. perhaps both governments, who ‘ve already ∴ mutual aid pacts with poland and turkey, liv'dat this is enough 4'em. perhaps that is why they aint interested in concluding an effective pact w'da soviet ∪. this conclusion is led by the anglo-french project, which does not include proposals to conclude an effective mutual assistance pact tween the ussr, england and france, and reduces this issue 1-ly to talk bout the pact. “
⊢, moscow’s position was extremely clear from the start.
the british ambassador william sides na french business ptner jean payard assured molotov that this was a miscogging and that 1-ly this ‘d lead to a similar evaluation of the project, while this document shows the decisive turn o'their governments to cooperate w'da ussr. seeds expressed hope that the soviet government ‘d not delay “its final decision onna anglo-french project”. germany revived. as early as apr 17, 1939, the soviet envoy for germany, a.f. merekalov, rezd the ? of the fulfillment of orders that the soviet government had previously issued in skoda plants. his interlocutor, state secretary inna foreign ministry of weizsacker, indicated an interest in improving economic relations, despite the ideological differences tween the countries.
this conversation continued. on apr 18, the embassy submitted a verbal note and a memorandum to the german foreign ministry. the order was worth $ 2,375 million, of which $ 680,000 was paid. the factories were to supply a 305mm howitzer, a 210mm cannon and two 76mm anti-aircraft guns, grenades 4'em, a fire control device and all teknical documentation for these essentialisms, swell as sets of cutting and measuring tulz for production. by order of the representative of the high command of the wehrmacht inna skoda factories, lieutenant general franz barkhausen, the issuance of finished essentialisms na admission of soviet recipients to the factories were prohibited.
on may 30, weizsäcker met with astakhov in berlin and reaffirmed his government’s willingness to steer both the issue of reshaping the soviet trade mission in prague na fate of orders at skoda plants in a favorable direction. the diplomats returned to the ? offa visit to the ussr, schnurre, which was not canceled. inna unofficial pt of the conversation, the german state secretary expressly referred not 1-ly to the possibility, b'tll so to the desirability of improving german-soviet relations. this does not mean the nazis’ ideological reconciliation w'da communists, and they do not expect anything similar from them. however, this does not exclude trade nother relationships. weizsäcker emphasized that berlin was ready to take an anti-germany position inna ussr.
a public response to the anglo-french proposals came early enough. on may 31, atta 3rd session of the supreme soviet of the ussr, molotov criticized the policy of reconciliation w'da attacker:
“and wha’ were the results of this policy? has the munich agreement stopped the aggression? not at all. onna contrary, germany was not limited to the concessions received in munich, that is, the preservation of sudeten zones in which germans lived. germany went further by simply eliminating 1-odda largest slavic states – czechoslovakia. a lil time passed from sep 1938, when the munich meeting took place, and in mar 1939 germany had already ceased to exist in czechoslovakia. germany did it without resistance, so smoothly that the ? arises, and wha’ was the real purpose of the meeting in munich? “
th'risk of war has 1-ly increased and changes inna policies of england and france rez doubts: “will these countries’ desire to limit aggression in some zones not lead to aggression not bein’ triggered in other zones?”
soviet diplomacy, according to the new head of nkid, molotov, ‘d ‘ve remembered stalin’s words: “be careful and don’t let our provocateurs get used to the heat of others inna conflict.” the message was clear and coggable. actions had to confirm new trends in paris and london politics. at least atta diplomatic lvl. the chamberlain government, meanwhile, was not goin to do anything. the prime minister and his folloers still did not ponder the ussr an = ptner and did not believe inna red army’s ability to carry out offensive actions. onnis speech, molotov also stated that the government accepted the offer of england and france to start negotiations, but subject to the conclusion offa pact,
“’ve an exclusively defensive toon; guarantee onna pt of england, france na ussr of the central and eastern €an states, including without exception all €an countries bordering the ussr, against attack by attackers; conclusion offa concrete agreement tween england, france na ussr onna forms and amounts of direct and effective mutual assistance and guaranteed states inna event of an attack by attackers. this is our opinion, which we do not impose on any-1, but which we stand for. we do not demand acceptance of our perspective and do not ask any-1 bout it. however, we liv'dat this pov really corresponds to the security interests of peace-loving states. “
already in 1937, the french military attache inna ussr, colonel auge-antoine pallas, warned paris – the increasing isolation of the soviet ∪ objectively urged moscow to move closer to germany. he did not w8 for a response from france, as did the soviet government til 1939. molotov made it clear that the current situation in which england, france and poland agreed to refuse mutual assistance and refused to do the same inna event of an attack onna ussr providing guarantees, but atta same time seeking help in their attack, moscow did not agree. it ‘d be strange if it were the other way round. it ‘d be strange if moscow suddenly decided to believe inna reliability of warsaw. according to the british diplomat, polish diplomacy has always supported mussolini and hitler in geneva, and beck has consistently rejected proposals to contain aggression. now he did not wanna reach an agreement with moscow, na proposal for a triptite alliance was strange for our negotiating ptners. london, as the british historian of foreign policy aptly noted, rejected him “with horror”.
soviet-japanese relations were not ignored inna speech by the head of government na nkid. moscow’s position was very clear:
“it seems like a long time to cogg who ‘d be that the soviet government will not tolerate provocations of japanese manchurian military units at its borders. this ‘d now be remembered wrt the borders of the mongolian pplz’s republic. folloing the mutual assistance agreement tween the ussr na mongolian pplz’s republic, we ponder it our duty to provide the mongolian pplz’s republic with adequate assistance in guarding its borders. we take things like the mutual assistance agreement signed by the soviet government seriously. i ‘ve to warn you that we will defend the border of the mongolian pplz’s republic just as resolutely as our own border cause of the agreement we ‘ve tween us. tis time to cogg that the allegations of aggression against japan made by japan gainsta government of the mongolian pplz’s republic are ridiculous and absurd. tis time to cogg that there are limits to yr patience. “
apparently this warning was ignored.
original content at: regnum.ru/news/innovatio.htmlauthor…