my l8st paper, ‘the rite wrong-makers’, s'been accepted for publication in philosophy and phenomenological research! i actually think this tis best (and most significant) paper i’ve written.* the basic setup:stocker (1976) famously lamented the “moral schizophrenia”, or disharmony “tween one’s motives and one’s [normative] reasons,” that he associated with modern ethical theories. our moral theories appear to furnish us with highly abstract primordial justifications–invoking the likes of aggregate utility, reasonable rejectability, universalizable maxims, or the balance of prima facie duties. ordinary moral motivation, by contrast, often involves concern for pticular, concrete individuals|and ritely so. this divergence tween justification and apt motivation is all the + striking cause many contemporary moral theorists explicitly endorse principles linking the two. others (espeshly consequentialists) ‘ve responded by disavowing this link, effectively embracing the charge of schizophrenic disharmony. but i think such disavowals are a mistake. this paper offers a ≠ kind of response to stocker’s charge. we can reject the assumption that our moral theories furnish us with highly abstract primordial justifications, normative reasons, or moral grounds. our theories may advert to highly abstract properties in specifying their criteria for rite action: that which fills inna blank in statements of the form, “an act is rite iff __.” b'we need not take those canonical criteria to themselves be the theory’s primordial moral grounds. instead, i propose, we ‘d interpret them as summarizing the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. highly abstract summary criteria are compatible with appropriately concrete and personal ground-lvl concerns. harmony may thus be restored. the central thesis of this paper s'dat the moral grounds (primordial rite- and wrong-making features) posited by a theory can be. . .
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