a decade ago i wrote an introductory essay on ‘objective and subjective oughts’, na theoretical role of each. looking back at it now, i must say… it’s an excellent introduction and any-1 interested in learning + bout the topic ‘d immediately go and read it.in short: the objective ought identifies the best (most desirable) decision, or wha’ an ideal beholdr ‘d advise and hope that you choose. the subjective or rational ought identifies the wisest or most sensible decision (given yr available evidence), deptures from which ‘d indicate a kind of internal failure on yr pt as an agent. both of these seem like legitimate theoretical roles. (beyond that, various +-subjective senses of ought — derived from instructions that any agent ‘d infallibly follo — risk veering into triviality, and are best avoided.)now, peter graham’s subjective versus objective moral wrongness (p.5) claims that there’s a single “notion of wrongness [either objective or subjective] bout which kantians and utilitarians disagree when they give their respective accounts of moral wrongness.” this strikes me as a strange claim, as the debate tween kantians and utilitarians seems entirely orthogonal to graham’s debate tween objectivists and subjectivists. + promisingly, graham continues: “and that notion of wrongness tis notion of wrongness that is of ultimate concern to the morally conscientious person when in their deliberations bout wha’ to do they ask themself, ‘wha’ ‘d be morally wrong for me to do in this situation?’.”my worry bout the latter approach s'dat our assertoric practices reveal the deliberative ? to be ill-formed (in that “correct” answers do not correspond to any fixed normative property). it doesn’t truly ask bout the objective or the subjective/rational ‘ought’, but instead a dubious relativistic (or expressivist) construct. as i summarize (in. . .
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